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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Two decades ago, exposés of child labor, forced labor, 
and other worker rights violations in subcontracted 
systems of production gave rise to global corporations 
recognizing the need to commit to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) principles, which in turn led to 
extensive programs and policies and supply chain 
monitoring programs. Many brands have since 
recognized the shortcomings of these CSR initiatives, 
which have been mostly voluntary, confidential 
schemes developed by corporations themselves or 
by multi-stakeholder initiatives lacking meaningful 
involvement from the workers whom the initiatives 
purport to serve. In response to the widely documented 
failures of this billion dollar CSR industry1 to protect 
workers’ rights, workers and their organizations 
have been exploring new models for engaging 
global brands to negotiate enforceable agreements 
and advance worker-driven social responsibility2 – 
ones that are not confidential, self-regulating, or 
management-driven. Our vision for more effective 
corporate accountability is one that ensures a 
meaningful role for the impacted workers in both 
the implementation and oversight of the initiative.
This new approach to supply chain accountability 
– one that relies on and fosters the leadership and 
participation of workers and their representatives 
– is essential because it corrects for fundamental 
design flaws in previous monitoring initiatives. CSR 
systems that treat workers as survey subjects rather 
than agents of change have effectively replaced 
workers’ valuable input with technical reports 
from for-profit auditors who parachute into the 
community, with no vested interest in those people. 
This has undermined the social structures necessary 
to enabling workers to effectively communicate and 
be heard about the conditions they face at work. 
This is particularly problematic for migrant workers 
who come in from the countryside, such as the 
millions of workers in China’s electronics industry.
In today’s global economy, the prices and purchasing 
practices of corporations, whose names workers may 
never know, have a disproportionate influence over 
working conditions and a deeply negative impact on 
workers’ lives and livelihoods. As a result, workers 
who attempt to solely negotiate a contract between 
a workplace level union and the management at that 
site will be limited in their ability to make and sustain 
change. The situation for the hundreds of millions 
of workers in China, the world’s largest producer 
of manufactured goods,3 is particularly challenging 
as independent trade unions are effectively banned 
in the country and grassroots labor groups face 
harassment and repression.4 It is precisely because of 
this repression of human rights that brands need to 
engage in worker-driven monitoring and help chart 
a new course for worker-manager relations in China. 
Large buyers and brands can do much more to advance 
workers’ rights by engaging in supply chain compliance 
programs that are negotiated with workers, which 
meaningfully represent workers’ interests and that 
are structured to be more directly responsive to their 
complaints – enabling more effective access to remedy. 
Global buyers and brands can also further aggregate 
their clout for change by adjusting their purchasing 
practices to better incentivize supplier participation 
and by pooling resources for compliance activities 
in their shared factories.5 If brands and retailers 
are committed to workers’ rights in the electronics 
industry, they should work towards engaging 
representative worker organizations in independent 
factory inspections and worker interviews. This 
engagement needs to be designed carefully, 
however, with adequate transparency and effective 
governance to prevent any efforts to coopt local 
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groups and ensure worker organizations are able 
to report findings without fear the brands will 
walk away. The goal is not to have brands contract 
local organizations to help improve their worker 
communications. Brands need to make a contractual 
commitment to the process, so that the program 
both supports and strengthens the capacity of these 
groups and improves workers’ access to remedy.
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights are fueling a growing number of incentives for 
global corporations to improve their human rights 
due diligence and remediation programs in their 
supply chains.6 Additionally, government agencies 
and other public institutions funded with taxpayer 
money, such as schools and hospitals in North 
America and Europe, can advance improvements in 
working conditions in their supply chains by including 
enforceable compliance requirements in their 
procurement contracts with electronics companies. 
Pooling resources for investigations in response 
to worker complaints of code violations leads to a 
greater ability to affect positive change on the factory 
floor as well as reduced cost for each institution. 
Currently, a worker-driven monitoring initiative 
in the electronics retail market does not exist. In 
this report, the International Labor Rights Forum 
(ILRF) and the Business, Human Rights and the 
Environment Research Group at the University of 
Greenwich (BHRE) aim to identify key components 
for how monitoring of working conditions in China’s 
electronics industry could be designed to be more 
responsive to labor rights groups’ visions for change. 
Our analysis draws on perspectives from a range 
of studies, including our own consultations with 
representatives from thirteen Chinese labor rights 
organizations, which are working closely with migrant 
workers in China’s export manufacturing industries 
and input from Electronics Watch, the main non-profit 
independent monitoring organization dedicated 
to protecting the rights of electronics workers in 
public procurement supply chains. The identities 
of the participating Chinese groups are anonymous 
in order to protect the individuals consulted.
The Chinese labor groups identified the prices 
and purchasing practices of the companies whose 
branded products are made in the factories as a root 
cause of the dismal working conditions. They argued 
that the brands and retailers have failed to protect 
against the exploitation of workers and to ensure 
remedy for human rights and labor rights abuses. 
They identified factory-level concerns that are in line 
with those previously exposed by civil society reports 
and academics.7 In summary, these concerns included 
low wages and excessive overtime, unfair dismissal, 
failure to provide the legally-required compensation 
for contract termination and factory relocation, 
underpayment to social insurance schemes, sexual 
harassment and gender discrimination, occupational 
disease and injury, and forced student labor. 
Over the twenty years that company-driven CSR 
initiatives have been operating in mainland China, 
Chinese labor groups have repeatedly voiced 
concerns based on their observation of the initiatives. 
These programs have been conducted without their 
involvement and leadership from the start and they 
generally perceive these programs as an ineffective 
interference. Their concerns with CSR indicate 
the need for a new approach, one where workers 
are the agents of change, driving it themselves 
– not the objects of change driven by others. 
Many of the Chinese labor groups we spoke with 
are involved in documenting rights violations in 
factories and assisting workers on individual factory-
level complaints or legal cases. They would value 
opportunities to strengthen and scale up their 
capacity building for this work. In addition, they 
would like to see buyers commit to enforceable 
agreements within which the buyers would: invite 
and respond to worker complaints; support and 
ensure their suppliers provide remediation for labor 
rights violations; support ongoing worker-driven 
monitoring; and address root causes to prevent 
future violations. Such an agreement would require 
brands to make adjustments to their pricing and 
purchasing practices in order to ensure reforms 
are sustainable. Brand purchasing practices that 
prioritize price, quality, and timely delivery without 
ensuring workers’ rights, only serve to perpetuate 
suppliers’ disregard for these rights. It is important 
that any monitoring initiative partner with these 
Chinese labor groups because of their independence, 
their experience with documenting violations 
and addressing complaints, and the trust that 
workers have in them to represent their interests. 
The electronics market is one of the fastest growing 
markets in the world. Electronics are produced in 
long and complex supply chains, from the mining 
of minerals, to the production of components, to 
final assembly of goods. Ten years ago, Shenzhen, a 
city in Guangdong province in southeastern China, 
became known as the world’s hub of electronics 
production as foreign direct investment poured 
into China and relocated production from other 
East Asian economies to China.8 Today, electronics 
are also manufactured in other regions of China. 
To compete for foreign direct investment, local 
authorities are often lax in taking the necessary 
measures to prevent labor rights violations and 
enforce labor laws, especially those directly 
relating to production, such as excessive overtime.9
Foxconn, which supplies Apple, Dell, HP, and 
Microsoft, and became infamous in 2010 for a 
spate of worker suicides at its massive Shenzhen 
facility that housed 500,000 workers, remains the 
largest private sector employer in China.10 It has 
1.3 million people on its payroll worldwide and 
boasts huge new facilities in Henan and Sichuan 
provinces.11 But the problem is much bigger than 
one company: indeed, worker suicides could affect 
up to twenty percent of electronics suppliers.12
Although wages in China grew above the rate of 
inflation and at more than ten percent each year 
from 1998 until 2012, the growth rate has decreased 
in recent years despite cost of living increases.13 
This year, Guangdong province froze the minimum 
wage last year with the intention to keep it fixed for 
three years.14 The minimum wage in the electronics 
industry across the country continues to fall short of 
a living wage15 and work pressure under exceedingly 
high quotas makes work just as stressful as ever.16 
Common worker complaints in the industry, often 
linked to harsh managerial methods, include verbal 
and physical abuse, the exploitative use of student 
interns, discrimination against women, the failure to 
pay the overtime premium according to the legal rate, 
and poor implementation of occupational health 
and safety standards.17 Workers may even be denied 
their right to resign, which is illegal and a form of 
forced labor, while others are unfairly terminated.18 
While workers are careful about how they raise 
concerns over their working conditions because they 
lack protection from reprisals, the persistent labor 
abuse in the industry has led workers to file a massive 
number of cases over labor rights violations. China’s 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 
reported 1.56 million registered labor dispute cases 
in 2014 across sectors nationwide.19 While China has 
passed a new Labor Contract Law and Labor Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Law to offer protection 
to workers, access to legal representation remains 
problematic for most workers.20 Other workers have 
resorted to protest and strikes when legal remedy is 
not possible. Since 2011, China Labour Bulletin has 
recorded 3,025 worker strikes in manufacturing, 
of which electronics is a major sector.21
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FAILURE OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Fifteen years of corporate-driven supply chain 
auditing22 has failed to substantially improve working 
conditions for the millions of Chinese workers who 
make electronic machinery and equipment for 
domestic consumption and global export. Despite 
the fact that supply chain auditing is a billion dollar 
industry, many egregious violations consistently 
go undetected, unreported, or unaddressed.23 The 
problems in the approach of most auditing initiatives 
are structural flaws that need to be reoriented to 
support workers and their organizations. Continuing 
to use a top-down auditing approach, while workers’ 
rights to organize and bargain collectively are 
restricted by law, has repeatedly sidelined workers’ 
voice, essentially undermining the stated rights-based 
goals of most workplace codes of conduct. There are 
four areas of structural flaws that need to be addressed 
in these programs: the lack of a meaningful role for 
workers, inadequate reporting and transparency, 
limited access to remedy, and purchasing 
practices that undermine compliance goals.
Lack of a Meaningful Role for Workers
The industry’s own sustainability initiatives do 
not engage with workers and their representatives 
on a systematic basis.24 As a result, they may not 
detect a whole range of code non-compliances. 
Issues often missed in audits include violations of 
freedom of association,25 gender-based violence 
and harassment, and occupational illness.26 
Electronics Watch, an independent non-profit 
monitoring organization, regularly finds serious 
labor rights problems that social auditors have 
failed to detect. For example, an Electronics Watch 
investigation in China found that neither the 
employer nor the brand buyer appeared to be aware 
that workers’ eyesight deteriorated after even just a few 
weeks of checking electronics screens for blemishes 
under bright lights.27 While the deterioration of 
eyesight was common knowledge among the workers 
in the factory, when these claims were put to the brand 
it said that, because it was not a “code violation,” 
their own audit had not reported on the problem. 
Despite the public attention to the issue of worker 
suicides in Chinese electronics factories, the issue 
may not come up in the course of audits as an area of 
concern that would need brands’ attention. If a brand 
does not even hear about this serious issue, it will not 
be in a position to identify, much less address, the 
underlying causes of the suicides, which include high 
work pressure, lack of respect from management, and 
workers’ inability to seek solutions to their concerns. 28 
The typical assumption of employers and brands is that 
suicides are related solely to individual psychological 
issues and are not connected to employment 
conditions, so if they do hear of cases of suicide or 
attempted suicide they often shrug off responsibility. 
It is common for factory managers in global supply 
chains to carefully curate information in preparing 
for audits. Auditors themselves have estimated that 
the majority of the factories they visit in China are 
forging some of the records they provide to auditors, 
meaning that in many cases brands’ assurances 
that they are abiding by labor laws are based on 
false information.29 The fabricated documents 
include time cards and payroll records to provide 
the appearance of compliance with the local labor 
law and brands’ codes of conduct.30 In fact, in many 
cases the human resources staff generating these 
documents are trained by “falsification engineers” 
who, according to journalist Alexandra Harney, 
“teach companies how to outsmart auditors.”31
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Another way in which information about the reality 
of working conditions in factories is carefully curated 
before reaching the eyes and ears of auditors is by 
workers themselves, whether out of fear or because 
management will award them with bonuses.32 
Electronics workers have reported to ILRF that 
managers brief them on what to say if an auditor 
questions them on the production line or brings them 
into a separate room for an interview.33 Because the 
practice of management selecting the workers who will 
be interviewed by auditors has been widely critiqued, 
it is now more common for an auditor to randomly 
point to particular workers on the production line to 
request them for the interview. This is insufficient for 
ensuring a safe interview environment for workers, 
however, given that they may worry that management 
is observing and tracking who was selected for the 
interviews. Even if a worker trusts that the auditor 
might not report back to management about what 
they shared, they fear it will be easy for management 
to deduce which workers spoke negatively about 
the conditions if the factory receives a less-than-
positive audit report. Therefore, when worker 
interviews are conducted on the premises of the 
factory, workers may often not raise any significant 
concerns over working conditions. The fact that 
such approaches to worker interviews continue in 
China is also an indication of auditors’ deep lack of 
understanding of workers’ situations, how precarious 
their lives are, and the levels of intimidation 
they experience, especially as migrant workers.
Inadequate Reporting and Weak 
Transparency
While auditors are not well-equipped to detect code 
non-compliances that only workers can report, 
the information on the non-compliances that they 
do detect may not always make it into the report 
delivered by the auditing firm to the buyer reading the 
report. According to Garrett Brown, “[t]he for-profit 
consulting companies providing CSR audits have 
every incentive — if they want to keep their clients in a 
very competitive market — of providing audit reports 
that meet their clients’ needs.”34 In many cases, the 
factory is responsible for financing the audit, so there 
is a direct incentive for the auditors to tread lightly 
and avoid offending management. The auditors know 
the factory’s failure could lose them the contract.
In addition to the problem of inaccurate or watered 
down findings, workers are usually left in the dark 
about the non-compliances that auditors do detect 
and report to brands. In fact, the Responsible 
Business Alliance, formerly the Electronic Industry 
Citizenship Coalition (EICC), does not provide any 
requirement or guidance that findings from audits 
conducted under its Validated Audit Program35 are 
disclosed to workers. In the case of chemical hazards 
or fire safety violations, this could mean that brands 
are knowingly leaving workers’ health and safety, and 
often even their lives, at risk.36 According to Electronics 
Watch, “from workers’ perspective transparency 
is not complete when social audit findings are 
proprietary to either employers or buyers and hidden 
from all others who could take action on the findings 
to improve their working conditions.”37 In many 
countries, this lack of transparency is even against the 
law, including in China, where Right-to-Know laws 
cover workers’ right to know about chemical hazards 
in their workplace. Although, implementation of 
these regulations needs to be improved,38 brands and 
retailers serious about protecting workers should 
ensure respect for this right in production facilities 
throughout their supply chains, including in 
countries where workers are not protected by Right-
to-Know laws or those laws are not implemented.
No Access to Remedy
The World Bank notes that factory owners’ 
“incentives are to offer the most competitive price 
and pay little attention to compliance, if not forced 
to do otherwise.”39 If factory owners will not address 
non-compliances on their own, however, then the 
buyers or brands that contract with them need to 
make compliance a contractual requirement. Buyers 
have the economic power to require compliance, 
but they most often tend to exercise this power by 
threatening or ending business with non-compliant 
suppliers.40 However, brands and retailers should 
only do that as a last resort. Ending contracts with too 
much haste when violations are discovered usually 
means that the working conditions in the facility 
remain poor. Although the buyer may feel they were 
correct to wash their hands of the problem, such 
irresponsible behavior means evading accountability 
and the workers will remain at risk while working 
for other brands. It is for this reason that the most 
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effective compliance initiatives have secured a 
contractual commitment from the brands that ensure 
their engagement results in remediation for workers. 
The Responsible Business Alliance (RBA) appears to 
measure its success largely by the number of audits 
that it has closed.41 This approach is problematic, 
however, because it can give a false sense of 
achievement, particularly in a context where workers 
never see the audit results or reports about the types 
of complaints filed and resolutions agreed and there 
may not be ongoing monitoring to ensure that factory 
management does not return to violating workers’ 
rights once they are no longer under the scrutiny of 
an auditor. It is also a highly problematic approach 
because the auditing system is heavily predicated 
on factories fixing the problem when in most cases 
it is brands that have the most economic power to 
enable the factory to make and sustain the changes. 
No Change in Brands’ Purchasing Practices
Unless and until brands change the pressures and 
demands their pricing and purchasing practices place 
on factories, they will do little to make sustainable 
change in labor conditions in the industry. Brands’ 
demands for quick turn production and competitive 
pricing is an open contradiction to their demand for 
labor rights compliance. A program that has serious 
intentions of detecting, correcting, and remediating 
non-compliances must address brands’ purchasing 
practices in order to make a sustainable difference. 
This includes the prices paid by the brand to the 
factory, order volume, last minute changes to orders, 
and the length and nature of their commitment to 
maintaining business with a particular factory.42 
When brands do not address underlying causes of 
non-compliance and the obstacles to compliance, 
then factories will continue to skirt compliance 
with their codes and the applicable laws. Common 
stories include increasing the hourly production 
target, keeping workers in the factory under forced 
and unpaid overtime until they have reached that 
quota, and harassment and retaliation against vocal 
labor organizers.43 Cutting corners to meet brands’ 
demands (and still operate the factory with a profit) 
can also involve shifting production to unauthorized 
subcontractors with worse working conditions. 
For example, one labor rights group reported that 
a small Chinese supplier to an electronics brand 
had complained to them that the factory had 
received price quotes from brands that were so 
low that the factory was considering outsourcing 
production to a prison without telling the brand.44
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Partnering with Worker-Centered 
Organizations
To achieve improvements in working conditions 
in China’s electronics factories, monitoring must 
identify labor rights violations and secure elimination 
of those abuses. Given the severe inadequacies of 
audits conducted by corporations themselves, their 
contracted third-parties, or by voluntary multi-
stakeholder initiatives in which they participate, it is 
clear that a different type of monitoring is needed to 
help achieve this change.45 Such a monitoring system 
will have the best chance at success in detecting 
problems and realizing improvements if workers 
are involved in its design and development, if it is 
governed independently from brands and employers 
or jointly by brands and worker representatives, 
and if financing can be set up so as to ensure the 
monitoring system is rigorous, objective, and fair.
Community-based labor rights organizations 
in China, which operate independently of the 
government and companies, have for years taken 
on identifying rights violations and supporting 
workers in remediation in the electronics industry.46 
They equip workers with legal knowledge and rights 
awareness, build confidence and skills in resolving 
labor disputes, and support democratic worker 
participation and negotiation. Workers are centrally 
involved in bringing cases to their attention and asking 
for legal counsel, participating in the mediation and 
arbitration processes, attending legal rights trainings, 
and seeking strategic support in their negotiations 
with management. These grassroots labor rights 
organizations are currently in the best position to 
guarantee workers’ voice, and it will strengthen any 
worker-driven monitoring initiatives in China’s 
electronics sector to explore partnerships with them. 
Developing a Shared Concept of Worker-
Driven Monitoring
Worker-driven monitoring means that workers, their 
organizations, or organizations of their choosing 
are in the driver’s seat in envisioning, developing, 
and implementing the monitoring system.47 An 
independent monitoring organization should have 
as a key tenet the belief that workers themselves are 
the best monitors of their working conditions.48 It 
recognizes that workers know the reality of their daily 
conditions – they can recite the epithets yelled at them 
when they are told to speed up production, describe 
the sexual harassment they face in detail, and recount 
when they are paid late – and have the ability to help 
drive changes if given the right tools and protections 
to act and to speak up and defend their rights. 
The idea of “worker-driven monitoring,” however, 
may be unfamiliar among China’s grassroots. Labor 
rights organizations do not generally use this or 
other similar terms to describe their practices. 
Furthermore, few of these grassroots organizations 
have had experience working with electronics 
brands or international independent monitoring 
organizations on monitoring programs. Others 
have had negative experiences relating to CSR 
initiatives and are skeptical of programs that 
involve brands, given the lack of positive impacts 
for workers resulting from those programs. Several 
groups consulted expressed interest in independent 
monitoring with an enforceable mechanism to 
ensure compliance, but such programs are still 
unknown to them. Based on our interviews, it is clear 
that it will be both a challenge and an important 
first step for stakeholders to clearly build a shared 
understanding of “worker-driven monitoring.” 
The practice of China’s labor rights organizations is 
ENVISIONING WORKER-DRIVEN 
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The mission of Electronics Watch is to help public sector organizations work together and collaborate 
with local monitoring partners to protect the labor rights and safety of workers in their electronics 
supply chains.
Electronics Watch organizes public sector buyers and gives them the essential tools to create effective 
market demand for decent working conditions in their ICT hardware supply chains, which includes 
portable and desktop computers, printers, display screens and media storage.  Public sector affiliate 
members pool resources through Electronics Watch to obtain reliable intelligence about working 
conditions at significantly reduced cost. They insert the Electronics Watch Contract Conditions53 
or equivalent conditions in ICT hardware contracts, requiring their contractors to exercise due 
diligence to achieve respect for labor rights and safety standards in factories that assemble or make 
the components of the goods they purchase. When public sector buyers in many countries take action 
together, based on the same supply chain intelligence and the same enforceable contract requirements, 
working conditions can improve.
Electronics Watch operates on an affiliation basis, rather than a fee for service.54 An affiliation 
relationship is more sustainable, and implies an organizational commitment to socially responsible 
public procurement.
Each public institution affiliated to Electronics Watch has access to an extensive international network 
of monitoring organizations that conduct worker-driven monitoring, with the goal of strengthening 
workers’ own voices to report on and address labor and safety issues in their factories.
Each affiliate commits to take the following steps:
•	 Incorporate the Electronics Watch Contract Conditions or equivalent clauses into electronics 
contracts with new suppliers or when contracts are renegotiated to enable Electronics Watch to 
monitor on its behalf.
•	 Appoint a liaison to serve as the primary point of contact between Electronics Watch and the 
organization.
•	 Pay annual affiliation dues to Electronics Watch based on annual purchasing volume of 
electronics products.55
already largely consistent with many of the essential 
elements of “worker-driven monitoring” outlined 
below. These organizations design their work in 
ways that support and empower workers and center 
their voices in monitoring and remediation efforts. 
Moreover, many understand monitoring to be as 
much about addressing specific labor rights violations 
as about building connections with and mobilizing 
workers and promoting workers’ participation in 
workplace management. They also emphasized the 
need for effective monitoring mechanisms within 
the workplace, such as workers’ committees. This 
provides a solid foundation to develop a shared 
concept of “worker-driven monitoring” among 
stakeholders within China’s electronics industry and 
it is essential that any such initiative would be built 
on the existing work of the local grassroots labor 
rights groups from the ground up, taking seriously 
their understanding, practices and concerns. 
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Electronics Watch56 
Building Independent Monitoring Capacity 
Most of China’s grassroots labor rights organizations 
are not professional monitoring organizations with 
extensive monitoring protocols. What they do have, 
however, is workers’ trust, which is built on their 
deep understanding of worker perspectives. For 
the last decade, many of these groups have become 
increasingly adept at casework. Working closely 
with workers in their locality, they help document 
abuses and gather worker testimony and evidence 
to support their legal cases. Some organizations 
have further developed the skills and expertise 
to carry out off-site surveys, analyze the data and 
publish reports on the working conditions and labor 
rights violations of local factories. Because they 
possess a grounded understanding of the applicable 
local labor and legal context, these groups are 
well-placed to scale up their monitoring capacity. 
Of the grassroots Chinese labor rights organizations 
consulted, many expressed interest in developing 
professional skills and staff capacity to hone their 
research methods and expand their ability to 
investigate and document systemic violations at 
the factory or industry level. Trainings for staff to 
conduct interviews or design surveys and supervise 
others, such as students of local universities or 
worker volunteers, can considerably strengthen 
their monitoring capacity. For cases where they 
lack on-site access, training could focus on how to 
identify violations through off-site interviews. More 
challenging is that on-site visits by qualified industrial 
hygienists and engineers are needed to identify 
workplace hazards stemming from toxic chemicals 
and fire and building safety violations.49 Capacity 
building could focus on building partnerships 
with technical experts and enabling systematic 
training on how to document these hazards. 
Facilitating Collaboration Between 
Chinese and International Groups
A critical first step prior to active collaboration on 
field based monitoring will be to establish direct 
communication and linkages between Chinese and 
international organizations in order to build trust and 
confidence. International organizations need to clarify 
their roles and responsibilities in their collaborations 
with local labor rights organizations. They should 
focus on strengthening local groups’ capacity and 
support their leadership, avoiding any unintentional 
displacement of local labor rights groups. 
To begin with, international labor rights and 
monitoring organizations could take steps in creating 
secure and confidential channels of communication 
and submission of information. Groups will need to 
overcome language barriers by designing Chinese-
language resources accessible to local organizations 
and workers. Additionally, local Chinese groups will 
need to review examples of successful cases of worker-
driven monitoring in order to analyze how and in 
what way it could be adapted to the Chinese context.
International organizations need to be prepared to 
respond with support in cases where serious rights 
violations are unaddressed and require immediate 
response and action. These include worker injury 
or death, dangerous occupational health and safety 
hazards, or factory closure without payment of the 
full compensation to which workers are legally 
entitled.50 International groups can also assist labor 
rights defenders at risk by engaging with brands and 
international media in seeking public attention to 
serious violations. While such collaboration is no 
substitute for systematic monitoring in the context 
of an enforceable agreement, it is useful for exposing 
violations, highlighting the need for monitoring 
and deepening connections among groups. 
Mitigating Risks for Workers, Chinese 
Groups and International Organizations 
Groups involved in developing the proposed initiative 
will need to assess and develop plans to mitigate 
risks relating to independent monitoring and 
collaboration between local and international labor 
rights groups in order to protect workers and labor 
rights groups. Risks have always existed for Chinese 
civil society groups, and they are experienced in 
assessing and managing risks arising from their 
work. The level of risk varies depending on the nature 
of collaboration and the groups involved, and should 
be evaluated accordingly. For example, risk is low for 
off-site monitoring and individual remediation by 
Chinese labor rights groups and higher for on-site 
monitoring and remediation of collective disputes. 
Involvement of labor rights groups in collective 
disputes, in particular, has been highly restricted 
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and increasingly so since the crackdown on labor 
rights organizations in the southern Chinese city of 
Guangzhou in December 2015, which led to arrests 
and forced closure of a number of organizations, 
with chilling effects on the rest of civil society.51 
Collaboration with international groups in capacity-
building and scaling up monitoring practices entails a 
higher level of risk, and should be assessed seriously. 
The adoption of the “Law on the Management 
of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations’ 
Activities within Mainland China” in 2017 requires 
international organizations to register their offices 
in China, or their Chinese counterparts to file for 
temporary activity permits for conducting activities 
in China, including labor rights monitoring and 
trainings.52 Both options are complex and restrictive, 
and local and international groups should become 
familiar with the implications of the Law and the 
possible options for collaboration under the Law. 
Notwithstanding, short of formalized partnerships, 
there remain a myriad of ways in which ongoing 
communication and exchange may contribute to 
developing worker-driven monitoring work in China.
Moving Toward Enforceable Brand 
Agreements
Effective worker-driven monitoring needs to be 
embedded in a program that addresses the structural 
flaws identified above. Whereas “auditing takes 
power away from workers,” as one labor rights 
organization that conducts monitoring in China told 
the authors, worker-driven monitoring is built on 
genuine and meaningful participation by workers. A 
full-fledged worker-driven monitoring system must 
be embedded in an enforceable brand agreement or 
within an independent monitoring program used 
by government purchasers that entails enforceable 
contractual obligations on the companies.
The following text box lays out some essential 
elements that should be incorporated into a wholly 
restructured approach to protecting workers’ rights. 
Although by no means final or exhaustive, we 
identify four essential elements for an approach that 
aims to address the structural flaws to supply chain 
compliance programs identified above: the need 
for meaningful worker involvement, transparency, 
a contractual commitment by brands, and changes 
to brands’ purchasing practices. It is important 
to consider, however, that some elements may be 
challenging to implement in the Chinese context.
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A Meaningful Role for Workers and Their Organizations:
1. Workers and their organizations are involved in the formulation, development, and co-governance57 
of the initiative and in defining the issues to be covered and compliance requirements to be monitored
2. Regular off-site consultations and engagement with local grassroots labor rights organizations 
representing or supporting workers at the facility to develop knowledge of local contextual issues, 
as well as background on area industrial relations and information-sharing about particular factory-
level grievances
3. Worker interviews are conducted in a way that secures workers’ trust and confidence, with sensitivity to 
language, gender and other issues, e.g. workers are randomly selected, but without management interference 
or knowledge of which workers are interviewed and interviews are conducted off-site in a confidential 
setting that allows for anonymity in order to minimize risk of any retaliation against interviewees 
4. If there is a worker-elected worker committee, such as an occupational safety and health committee, 
that is genuinely independent from management, include a member on the monitoring team 
5. Workers have a guarantee of non-retaliation against those who participate in monitoring, are 
interviewed, or come forward with a formal grievance
 
Transparency and Integrity in Reporting:
6. Ensure that workers themselves have prompt access to detailed supplier-level audit/monitoring 
reports, including names and addresses of the suppliers as well as audit findings, made available in 
the predominant language of the workforce as well as in the language of the buyers/brands
7. Make the audit reports and findings publicly available, in consultation with workers, and in ways that 
ensure there are no unintended consequences for them
8. Brands publish their supplier factory names and addresses online, including the names of the parent 
companies, with increasing disclosure over time further down the supply chain
Ensuring Access to Remedy:
9. Time-bound corrective action plans developed for the correction and remedy of identified violations, 
incorporating recommendations from workers and factory-based worker committees, if they exist 
10. Mechanisms for identifying the changes needed to address root causes of the violations, involving 
workers, management and buyers
11. The monitoring organization maintains regular contact with local worker organizations in order to ensure 
that improvements recommended as a result of the investigation are implemented and maintained, and 
that the management does not revert to the prior practices that had resulted in violations
12. Create and maintain an independent mechanism for complaints, in which workers can submit 
complaints directly and that guarantees non-retaliation against workers who access the complaint 
mechanism and provides complainants access to free independent legal aid
Brand Agreements to Guarantee Brand Purchasing Practices Enable Compliance:
13. Participating brands make a contractual commitment to adhere to the recommendations from the 
monitors and to work with the factories to achieve and maintain compliance
14. Brands make a contractual commitment to maintain business during a pre-determined period of 
time and/or to sever business relations in extreme cases in order to ensure their suppliers are able to 
fully remediate any problems identified
15. Brands commit to examining their purchasing practices as part of the root cause analysis of violations
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Essential Elements of Worker-Driven Monitoring
The widespread exploitation of the workers who 
produce electronics and the failures of social auditing 
over the past fifteen years in the electronics industry 
call for the development of a new vision and model 
to advance corporate accountability – one with the 
interests and active participation of workers at its 
heart. To ensure that workers are central to this new 
paradigm and the resulting programs, independent, 
democratic worker representatives and labor rights 
organizations must have a lead role in developing it.
Our consultations with grassroots labor rights 
organizations supporting Chinese workers show that 
many of these organizations are frequently assisting 
workers with the documentation of labor violations 
and in seeking remedy. For these local organizations, 
the only way they would consider social auditing 
or monitoring as a legitimate activity in support of 
workers is if it were independent, worker-centered, 
and enforceable. Several of the organizations do not 
consider the professional auditors to be monitoring 
in credible ways and with the interests of workers at 
heart. In their view, monitoring by partnering with 
workers, as they do, is the only way to guarantee 
credible monitoring that supports workers. They 
believe that workers are the best monitors of their 
own conditions. Their challenge is thus how to 
translate workers’ ability to identify violations of 
China’s labor law and non-compliances with brand 
codes of conduct into change on the factory floor. 
Although by no means final or exhaustive, in this 
paper we identified four essential elements for 
an approach that aims to address the structural 
flaws to confidential, nonbinding supply chain 
compliance programs: the need for meaningful 
worker involvement, transparency, a contractual 
commitment by brands, and changes to brands’ 
purchasing practices. While some of these elements 
may be challenging to achieve and implement in the 
Chinese context, any program short of encapsulating 
these elements will fall short of adequately 
addressing the Chinese labor groups’ concerns.
To have the commitments and clout needed to make 
change, the practice of worker-driven monitoring 
must be embedded in an enforceable agreement 
and accompanied by sufficient funding, staff and 
resources. In order to enforce such agreements 
public institutions could also be brought in. For 
example, agreements can be enforced through a 
contract between a public institution and a brand 
or retailer. Another option, which has been piloted 
in Bangladesh’s garment factories through the 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety, but has yet to 
be explored in the electronics industry, is for brands 
to sign enforceable co-governance agreements with 
worker-representative organizations. If such an 
enforceable brand agreement is eventually developed 
then public institutions could adopt requirements to 
only contract with electronics brands that have signed 
the agreement, product availability permitting.
In the meantime, an immediate action that brands 
and retailers can implement is to publicly disclose 
their supplier factory names and addresses (and the 
names of the parent companies) and the products 
and components made in each factory.58 Over time, 
brands can advance transparency by increasing their 
disclosure to the raw materials level. The Challenge 
to the Global Electronics Industry to Adopt Safer 
and More Sustainable Products and Practices, and 
Eliminate Hazardous Chemicals, Exposures and 
Discharges,59 with endorsers from over 40 countries, 
includes key points related to materials disclosure, 
prevention, worker compensation, and remediation. 
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Brands and retailers should continuously review and 
adapt purchasing practices to ensure that the brand 
is not responsible for contributing to or causing 
harm through low pricing, short turnaround orders, 
last-minute order changes, or cutting and running 
from non-compliant facilities – and to develop 
long-term relationships with compliant suppliers. 
Among the many immediate actions that employers 
could take to make improvements in factories, is to 
use safer chemicals and provide the proper safety 
equipment and require its usage, as per Chinese law. 
Also, employers should take the necessary steps to 
remediate the problems found in audits, involving 
workers in the solutions, and brands when necessary. 
They can also share information with brands about the 
effects of their purchasing practices. They can support 
supply chain transparency by providing workers with 
regularly updated information about which brands 
the factory is supplying. When audits take place, 
employers should welcome unannounced visits and 
allow free access to all areas where workers are present, 
and they should not provide preparatory coaching for 
workers, interfere with or be present during worker 
interviews, track which workers auditors speak with, 
or retaliate against workers who speak with auditors.
 
Public institutions are key players in supporting 
the model we propose. Public bodies that procure 
electronics should commit to only support monitoring 
that is worker-driven. Public institutions will need to 
allocate sufficient annual funding for monitoring and 
engage electronics brands to ensure remediation when 
the monitor reports violations at suppliers. In their 
contracts with electronics brands, they should include 
contract performance clauses that continue to apply 
throughout the contract. Purchasers could also use 
award criteria to provide preferences for those bidders 
(if any) that verifiably demonstrate compliance.
We have laid out the case for why brands’ current 
practices are not enabling sustainable change or 
securing remedy for workers’ rights violations in their 
supply chains. Securing global electronics brands’ 
commitments to the new approach to corporate 
accountability proposed in this paper will require a mix 
of pressure and incentives, and will require support 
from investors and government purchasing agencies, 
which have tremendous buying power in electronics.
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